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With the publication of the First Discourse, Rousseau initiated a famous debate over the social value of the arts
and sciences. As this debate developed, however, it transformed into a question of the value of the intellectuals as a
social class and touched upon questions of identity formation. While the philosophes were lobbying to become
a new cultural aristocracy, Rousseau believed the ideological glorification of intellectual talent demeaned the
peasants and working classes. This essay argues that amour propre, as put forth in the Second Discourse, was in
part designed to address this concern and is an attempt to highlight the dangers of making talent the measure of
a human.
W
hile amour propre is often associated with
Rousseau, it is not unique to him. In fact,
he first makes mention of it in the twilight
of its popularity. It has been well-established that the
psychological concept was commonplace among phi-
losophers in the late sixteenth, seventeenth, and first
half of the eighteenth century. As Arthur Lovejoy
demonstrates, a variety of thinkers—‘‘theologians of
different sects, philosophers of conflicting schools,
pense´e-writers and satirists, Catholics, Protestants,
and free-thinkers’’ (1968, 131)—who had little in
common and might have even viewed one another as
intellectual adversaries, were united in their convic-
tion that amour propre was the defining trait of hu-
man nature. Indeed, the roster of intellectuals who
adopted the psychology of amour propre is impres-
sive in its diversity: the Jesuit Mariana, numerous
Jansenists including Pascal and Nicole, the Protestant
Jacques Abbadie, the skeptic Montaigne, moralistes
such as La Rochefoucauld and La Bruye`re, and a host
of Enlightenment thinkers. In addition to Rousseau,
Mandeville, Voltaire, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson,
etc., all developed psychologies that involved amour
propre.1 Rousseau is not even the only saloniste to
make use of the term. D’Alembert (1967c, 340–42)
employs it several times in his ‘‘Essai sur la Socie´te´
des Gens de Lettres et des Grands’’ soon after
Rousseau first utters it in ‘‘Preface to Narcisse.’’2
Given the widespread usage of amour propre, it is
not surprising that it is treated and conceptualized in
a variety of ways. For example, Pascal finds amour
propre a helpful tool in his attempts to demonstrate
that human nature was wholly corrupted after the
Fall. Secular thinkers such as Mandeville believe it
is of great economic value and facilitates human
sociability. Identifying how and for what purposes
Rousseau uses amour propre is no simple affair. It
shows up in many of his writings and is used in a
variety of contexts. At times, he links amour propre to
sexual instincts and establishes how it makes sexuality
social. At other times, he focuses on the ontology of
the emotion and emphasizes the potentially degrad-
ing dependencies that all humans experience. As a
political and social theorist, moreover, he connects
amour propre with economic inequality and makes
much of the hidden psychological effects of what is
often viewed as a rational activity and sphere of life. It
is central to his powerful critique of modernity and
eighteenth-century democratic capitalism. Arguably,
it is the problem that both the education of Emile
and the general will are designed to solve. In addition,
recent scholarship stresses the positive dimensions of
amour propre in Rousseau’s thought and emphasizes
that he accepts the ordinary vice as ‘‘a useful but
dangerous instrument’’ (Rousseau 1969a, 536 [Emile];
cf. Dent 1988; Dent and O’Hagan 1998; O’Hagan
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1Hirschman (1977, 112) and Manent (1998, 86–92) both contend that the publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in 1776 puts
an end to the dominance of the psychology of amour propre.
2The essay was written in 1753.
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1999, 162–179; Cooper 1998, 1999).3 Traditionally,
Rousseau is viewed as one of the few eighteenth-
century theorists who held a consistently negative
valuation of amour propre (Jack 1978; Lovejoy 1968).
By contrast, a good number of seventeenth-century
theorists and almost all of Rousseau’s contemporaries
in the Enlightenment are far more ambivalent about
such vices. Accepting the limits of human nature,
these thinkers believe vanity and other ordinary vices
could be manipulated to function as virtues and
benefit the community. Even some religious intellec-
tuals, including Nicole and Pascal, accept that amour
propre has social value in the city of man (Hirschman
1977, 16–18; Keohane 1980, 275–311). This more
recent scholarship eagerly contends that Rousseau is
more than willing to stand with his Enlightenment
brethren and use amour propre to strengthen attach-
ments to morality as well as the public good.
As helpful as all the amour propre scholarship is,
it remains incomplete. The purpose of this essay is to
identify a neglected but vitally important aspect of
amour propre that has yet to receive thorough
scholarly examination. More specifically, I argue that
Rousseau believes amour propre to be particularly
dangerous when talent is the social locus of its
expression. A good many Enlightenment thinkers
believe inequality is acceptable, and indeed should
be rewarded, if it is predicated on talent. For the
philosophes, it was an article of faith that the intellec-
tually talented are of inestimable social value and
should be placed at the top rung of the social ladder.
Under this proposed arrangement, Rousseau main-
tains that natural inequalities are overemphasized and
the working classes and peasants are made to feel
ashamed because of their inferior cognitive abilities.
When the value of a person’s life is reduced to his or
her intellectual talents, he argues, much of the pop-
ulation will experience painful existential anxiety
and succumb to a sense of worthlessness. Amour
propre, in part, is designed to pierce through and
discredit the ideologies constructed to elevate natural
inequalities.
Rousseau in Paris: A Quest for Fame
A brief glimpse into Rousseau’s life makes clear why he
viewed the elevation of the intellectual classes as a
dangerous social problem. At an early age, like many
ambitious boys from the provinces, Rousseau was filled
with dreams of becoming a famous man of letters and
had full confidence that his talents were more than
sufficient to achieve any goal his imagination could
supply (Damrosch 2005, 40). In The Confessions, he
divulges that his move to Paris in 1742 is partially
inspired by his adolescent dreams: ‘‘A young man who
arrives in Paris with a passable appearance and who is
heralded for his talents,’’ he recounts thinking, ‘‘is
always sure of being welcomed’’ (Rousseau 1959,
283).4 Unfortunately for Rousseau, his abilities did
not appear until relatively late in life, and few counted
him among the talented. He was viewed as ordinary
by most who knew him in his pre-Paris days and
just about everyone, Parisian friends included, were
shocked by the success of the First Discourse.5 As
Starobinski (1971, 26) avers, Rousseau’s childhood
and early adulthood is akin to the state of nature he
describes in the Second Discourse. It is a time in which
he struggled to develop his abilities. Slowly, however,
he progressed thanks to a good deal of self-education
and a few profitable jobs, such as being a tutor for
the Mably family. By the time he arrived in Paris, he
had fully bloomed and was ready to make a name for
himself.
From early on, however, it became clear that life
as a man of letters was much harsher than he had
earlier supposed. His talents were not immediately
welcomed, and he was never fully comfortable mak-
ing them the core of his identity. His first try at fame,
which came in the form of a submission of a musical
notation system to the Academy of Sciences, revealed
a spiteful side to Rousseau that seems almost un-
imaginable in his younger self. Although the com-
mittee ultimately rejected the system, Rousseau was
congratulated for a fine effort and encouraged to
pursue further study in the field. Rousseau, however,
saw no silver lining in the committee’s decision, and
his reaction was bitter. Aside from one objection
from the famous composer Rameau, Rousseau dis-
missed the committee’s criticisms as nonsense and
3Although he wasn’t the first theorist to notice a positive amour
propre, it would be fair to argue Dent is the father of this
reassessment. His general argument, that a positive form of
amour propre encourages mutual respect and a concern for others
provided that it is grounded in equality, is identifiable in Emile.
For a nice, short summary of Dent’s basic argument, see Dent
and O’Hagan (1998). Cooper adds to Dent’s analysis by suggest-
ing that amour propre promotes familial and conjugal love, civic
virtue, compassion, moral heroism, etc. It even helps Emile
contend with bouts of self-contempt (Cooper 1998, 663–669.) All
the Rousseau, d’Alembert, Diderot, and Trousson translations are
my own except d’Alembert (1963 and 2004).
4It should not be forgotten, however, that he was finally
motivated to go to Paris because his lover, Mme Warens, had
replaced him. Still, it is significant that he chose to move to Paris.
He did have other options available.
5The one exception, as Damrosch reports, was Mme Warens (cf.
Damrosch 2005, 158).
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remained angry at them at least until he wrote The
Confessions some 25 years later (1959, 284–85).6
Rousseau did have some positive experiences in Paris.
He was accepted in the salons, where his rustic man-
nerisms and creativity were appreciated (Cranston
1982, 161–62). He also managed to make several
friends among the salonistes, including Diderot,
d’Alembert, Condillac, d’Holbach, and contributed
several articles on music and one on political econ-
omy to Diderot and d’Alembert’s famous Encyclope´die.
Yet he never seemed at home in Paris and eventually
succumbed to severe feelings of alienation and self-
loathing.
By 1749, before he had written the First Discourse,
he had already soured on Paris. In the ‘‘Epistle to
M. De L’Etang,’’ he blasts it as an arrogant, snobby,
inauthentic city that, in revealing foreshadowing,
‘‘crushes humble talents’’ (Rousseau 1961, 1150).
His great epiphany that the arts and sciences corrupt
morals, prompted by his stumbling across the Acad-
emy of Dijon’s advertisement for an essay contest in
the Mecure de France on his way to visit Diderot in
prison, seems to be in part inspired by his disappoint-
ments in the capital of the Enlightenment. The First
Discourse gives philosophical expression to this dis-
content and is a grand, if somewhat derivative, de-
construction of the values of intellectual life and the
great cities that housed it. Rousseau leaves no stone
unturned, exposing the petty motives that inspire the
arts and sciences and developing numerous argu-
ments discrediting their alleged social value. Far from
a noble pursuit, he asserts the development of the arts
and sciences is fueled by vanity and ambition. Artists
and scientists are creatures of ego who are more
concerned with their own glory than any social good
that might result from their pursuits (Rousseau 1959,
1013 [Reveries of a Solitary Walker]); Rousseau 1961,
965 [‘‘Preface to Narcisse’’]; 1964, 21 [First Dis-
course]).7 And society does not benefit, as Mandeville
and others argue, from these ordinary vices. The
growth of the arts and sciences produce unhealthy
levels of wealth, which in turn sets in motion a
perverse trinity of hypocrisy, effeminacy, and idleness
(Rousseau 1964, 19 [First Discourse]; Rousseau 1964,
74[‘‘Last Reply’’]; Rousseau 1961, 965–66 [‘‘Preface
to Narcisse’’]). In the new commercial economy
fueled by intellectual discovery, perception becomes
all-important, and it is advantageous to appear vir-
tuous without actually being so. Likewise, the im-
pressive economic gains that result from the arts and
sciences, Rousseau contends, only serve to make men
become lazy and effete (Rousseau 1961, 966 [‘‘Preface
to Narcisse’’]; Rousseau 1964, 22–23 [First Discourse];
Rousseau 1969a, 1089–90 [Moral Letters]; Rousseau
1969b, 93–94, 101–03 [Letter to d’Alembert on the
Theater]).8 In addition, Rousseau complains that
the old moral system crumbled under the weight of
the new arts and sciences. Religion and patriotism suf-
fered badly: ‘‘they [the men of letters] smile disdain-
fully at such old-fashioned words as Fatherland and
religion’’ (Rousseau 1964, 19 [First Discourse]).9 More-
over, Rousseau paradoxically contends that the new
status accorded to the arts and sciences had delete-
rious effects on the writers and scientists themselves.
Not only were there various unproductive rivalries
amongst the intellectuals, writers (and Voltaire is
mentioned by name) were forced to dumb down
their works and pander to public opinion (Rousseau
1964, 21 [First Discourse]).10 The men of letters’
desire for fame, Rousseau further claims, comes at
the expense of the search for truth.11 The new in-
tellectuals were more interested in showing off their
knowledge than in its actual benefit (Rousseau 1959,
1069 [Reveries of a Solitary Walker]). The best thing
that could happen to genius, he argues, is for it to be
left alone to develop apart from all the corruptions of
society.
6He would later also turn on Rameau, who accused him of
plagiarizing an opera.
7Rousseau, of course, claims he is much less affected by such
vanity. As early as ‘‘Preface to Narcisse,’’ marking the first of
many such proclamations, he asserts that he has learned to do
without the esteem of others (Rousseau 1961, 959). In one of
his fragments, he cites his penchant for solitude as evidence for
his superior temperament: ‘‘proof that I have less amour propre
than other men, or that mine affects me less, is that I have
the capability of living alone’’ (1959, 1124 [Autobiographical
Fragments]).
8Granted, Rousseau had to retreat slightly from this position
because many artists and scientists were anything but lazy and
rich. Nevertheless, this only proved for Rousseau that the arts and
sciences were even more iniquitous than he previously thought.
The artists and scientists who create the wealth, he argued, have
no share in it and wind up supporting the lavish lifestyles of the
slothful and greedy (Rousseau 1964, 50–51 [‘‘Observations’’]).
9Compare also ‘‘Preface to Narcisse,’’ in which Rousseau claims
that ‘‘the taste for philosophy relaxes all the lines of esteem and
benevolence that attach men to society’’ (Rousseau 1961, 967), as
well as Rousseau’s comment that the intellectuals were ‘‘ardent
missionaries’’ from the Reveries (Rousseau 1959, 1016). For a
good discussion of Rousseau’s arguments on religion, see Kelly
(2003, 148–51).
10In his own life, Rousseau thought his intellectual friends, the
d’Holbach coterie, were jealous of his successes. Although they
could all write, he believed none of them, save Duclos, could
forgive him for the success of his opera (Rousseau 1959, 387
[Confessions]).
11In The Confessions, Rousseau similarly contends ‘‘it is too
difficult to think nobly when one thinks for a living’’ (1959, 403).
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None of this is new as is well-documented by
scholars. Toward the end of the essay, however,
Rousseau makes a bold and highly original claim—
one that becomes increasingly important in the years
leading up to the Second Discourse and comes to
define his debate with the philosophes. The social
esteem accorded to intellectual talent and genius, he
argues, demeans the overwhelming mass of ordinary
citizens. In this new world of the arts and sciences,
Rousseau thinks the basis of individual identity is
dramatically altered, as identities based on moral
character and citizenship give way to ones based on
talent. In one passage, for example, he laments that
‘‘we have Physicists, Geometricians, Chemists, As-
tronomers, Poets, Musicians, Painters; we no longer
have citizens’’ (Rousseau 1964, 26 [First Discourse]).
In another, he complains that ‘‘one no longer asks
about a man if he has probity but if he has talents’’
(Rousseau 1964, 25 [First Discourse]).12 For the
ordinary working-class and peasant citizen, Rous-
seau believes this shift is catastrophic. Those ‘‘to
whom Heaven has not vouchsafed such great talents
and whom it does not destine for so much glory’’
(Rousseau 1964, 29 [First Discourse]) will find life
frustrating and demoralizing because they will be
encouraged to think they are only of value if they are
engaged in the arts and sciences. They will thus be
judged by traits they have no control over and cannot
hope to succeed: ‘‘someone who all his long life will
be a bad versifier or an inferior Geometer might
perhaps have become a great clothier’’ (Rousseau
1964, 29 [First Discourse]). Outside the great urban
intellectual centers, Rousseau argues that people are
judged by their own good character and patriotism,
which are things everyone can develop. In Paris and
others cities in which talent replaces virtue as the
standard for what it means to be an excellent human
being, most people will come to loathe themselves
and think they are of no value. In Rousseau’s own
words, ‘‘men are rewarded only for qualities which
do not depend on them: for we are born with our
talents, only our virtues belong to us’’ (1961, 966
[‘‘Preface to Narcisse’’]). Societies that overvalue
intellectual talent thus contain within them a bizarre
and existentially troublesome contradiction. They
still require farmers, clothiers, watchmakers, etc, but
refuse them the social basis of self respect.13
For the son of a watchmaker raised in the
working-class Saint Gervais section of Geneva, this
realization must have been maddening.14 Through-
out his career as a writer and social commentator,
Rousseau combats this bourgeois tendency by hold-
ing up the traits of the working classes—simplicity,
moderation, hard work, and authenticity—as uni-
versal virtues to which everyone should aspire.15 He
was soon suspicious of all social hierarchies, partic-
ularly those based on talent and ability. ‘‘In a well-
constituted State,’’ he proselytizes, ‘‘all citizens are so
equal that no one is preferred to others as being nei-
ther the most learned nor even the most skillful . . . ’’
(Rousseau 1961, 965 [‘‘Preface to Narcisse’’]).16 In
Emile, Rousseau openly flouts Parisian values by di-
recting his student ‘‘to desire mediocrity in every-
thing, without excepting even beauty’’ (1969a, 769).
He saw it as his duty to protect the dignity of the
average person against the new Enlightenment values
that for Rousseau amounts to little more than an
ideological glorification of the intellectuals. This sen-
sibility in part inspires Rousseau’s discussion of
amour propre in the Second Discourse.
The Philosophe Response
The philosophes were plainly aware of Rousseau’s
critique and were conflicted about how to respond.
12In ‘‘Preface to Narcisse,’’ he continues this line: ‘‘once talents
preempt the honors owed to virtue . . . everyone wants to be an
agreeable man and no one cares to be a good man’’ (1961, 966).
13In the Constitutional Project for Corsica, Rousseau claims he
wants his new constitution to furnish ‘‘all the means of acquiring
esteem’’ (1964, 924).
14Rousseau lived in Saint Gervais from age five to ten (for an
excellent discussion of the impact of Saint Gervais on Rousseau,
see Rosenblatt 1997, 29–34). Rosenblatt challenges the traditional
view that Rousseau idealized his hometown of Geneva. Rather,
she argues Geneva is important for Rousseau because it intro-
duced him to the ugly sides of class conflict.
15One need only consult Emile’s education to make this case.
More interesting evidence comes from the Letter to d’Alembert on
the Theater, in which Rousseau even argues that true genius
resides in the provinces (and not just because most of the
philosophes were provincials themselves): ‘‘Provincial men,’’
Rousseau contends, ‘‘are more individualistic, more inventive,
less self-conscious, and less imitative then their Parisian counter-
part’’ (1969b, 54–56; cf. Emile 1969a, 470–80).
16Rousseau never defines talent, and there is a good reason he
neglects to do so. As this passage makes clear, any distinctive talent
can become socially esteemed and be used to denigrate those
without such talents. From his own experiences during the eight-
eenth-century Enlightenment, it was the intellectuals who claimed
for themselves special status based on their abilities. However, one
can imagine a society in which the talents of the peasants, such as
strength ormechanical ability, define the best and the brightest. For
example, a silversmith or carpenter in certain societies may be the
most esteemed while intellectuals are scorned. As such, for
Rousseau, ‘‘neither the learned nor even the most skillful’’ ought
to be entitled to claim social superiority. He does not, to my mind,
imply the peasants and working classes have no talents.
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At first, they did not appear to view Rousseau’s
essay as a threat (Trousson 1988, 277).17 Diderot,
in fact, took credit for the idea and claims it was
nothing more than a clever attempt to give Rous-
seau’s essay an edge in a competitive contest.18
Whatever he privately thought about the quality
of the essay or its central argument, he encouraged
his friend to use it as a springboard to attain the
fame all the philosophes sought. To that end, he
insisted to Rousseau that the essay be published and
then lavished him with praise when it grabbed
Europe’s collective attention: ‘‘It succeeds beyond
the skies,’’ he told Rousseau, ‘‘there is no precedent
for a success like it’’ (Rousseau 1959, 363 [Con-
fessions]).19 D’Alembert likewise was congratula-
tory towards Rousseau and even mildly accepting of
his main argument. In his celebrated Preliminary
Discourse to the Encyclopedia, he proclaims the essay
‘‘has done much honor to it author’’ (1963, 103fn)
and even agrees that knowledge is not always
beneficial. ‘‘Letters,’’ he asserts, ‘‘certainly contrib-
ute to making society more pleasing; it would be
difficult to prove because of them men are better
and virtue is more common’’ (d’Alembert 1967a,
82 [Preliminary Discourse]).20 He refuses in the end,
however, to concede Rousseau’s argument that knowl-
edge undermines virtue and furthermore contends
that vice is much more dangerous when combined
with ignorance.21 Still, if this is a rebuke of the First
Discourse, it is not an aggressive one. Moreover, he
shows sensitivity to Rousseau’s concern for the work-
ing classes by making sure to include entries for the
mechanical arts in the Encyclope´die. While their
inclusion was undoubtedly the result of the d’Alem-
bert’s Baconian belief that knowledge ought to be
useful and probably were not intended to mollify
Rousseau, he does go out of his way to criticize the
low esteem in which artisans are typically held: ‘‘but
society, while justly respecting great geniuses for
enlightening it, ought not to degrade the hands by
which it is served’’ (d’Alembert 1967a, 41 [Prelimi-
nary Discourse]).22 Diderot also showed such sensi-
tivity, particularly in his literary works and
‘‘bourgeois tragedies’’ (Wilson 1972, 269–70). As this
initial show of support indicates, Rousseau’s divorce
from both Paris and his friends lasted several years.
If d’Alembert and the philosophes were hesitant,
at least for a while, to make a public show of their
disapproval of Rousseau’s First Discourse, they were
not shy about promoting themselves as an important,
if not the preeminent social class. They actively cam-
paigned to become the new aristocracy and legitimate
arbiters of social value and taste (Dieckmann 1941,
153; Goodman 1994, 35–39; Hulliung 1994, 77–78,
88–94).23 As far back as 1733, in his Letters Concerning
the English Nation (1994, 112–15), Voltaire was praising
the English for venerating men of merit. D’Alembert,
who was particularly incensed at the paternalistic
relationship between the men of letters and the
intellectual aristocrats, followed his good friend
Voltaire by reminding the aristocrats they were not
superior to the men of letters and indeed indebted to
them. In ‘‘Essai sur la Socie´te´ des Gens de Lettres et
17Trousson writes that his friends ‘‘did not seem to take offense
neither at the thesis of the Discourse nor the responses.’’
18Diderot’s claims continue to be a source of controversy. On
the Diderot side, Furbank (1992, 51–52) believes Diderot did
in fact supply Rousseau with his grand idea. Wilson (1972,
114–15) is more circumspect and refuses to comment either
way. The primary Anglo Rousseau biographers—Cranston and
Damrosch—deny Diderot’s claim. Damrosch calls it ‘‘highly
improbable’’ (2005, 213–14), and Cranston claims ‘‘there is no
evidence among his papers to justify our believing that he made
it’’ (1982, 229). Trousson, the most authoritative of Rousseau’s
French biographers, states ‘‘without a doubt, he (Diderot) did
not inspire the main idea’’ (1988, 263). As for Diderot’s attitude,
Cranston thinks he did not see it as a frontal assault on the
Enlightenment and may have viewed it as ‘‘an entertaining
paradox.’’
19Another philosophe, Grimm, was also supportive until 1754
(Trousson 1988, 278). Trousson, speculating about Rousseau’s
mood upon hearing he won the contest, states that ‘‘one imagines
the joy in the little household on Grenelle Street, and the
accolades of Diderot and Grimm’’ (1988, 266).
20In his reply to Rousseau’s letter, furthermore, he concedes that
‘‘public esteem is the principal goal of every Writer’’ (d’Alembert,
2004, 357). For his part, Rousseau was flattered by d’Alembert’s
remarks (Trousson 1988, 278).
21Granted, in his Letter to d’Alembert on the Theater, Rousseau
somewhat mocks the contention that the arts and sciences have
their uses in corrupt societies. In Paris, he sarcastically comments
that the theatre ought to be maintained because it serves as a
potential distraction for criminals. The two hours they spend in
the theater is two hours they will be unable to do mischief,
thereby reducing crime by one-twelfth (Rousseau 1969b, 54). In
‘‘Preface to Narcisse’’ (1961, 972), he similarly argues that college,
libraries, spectacles, etc are not designed to promote goodness
but provide distractions from doing evil.
22Naturally, the same could be said of Diderot (cf. France 1983,
85).
23Hulliung correctly notes that Rousseau’s early works, and
indeed his use of amour propre in the Second Discourse, are in
part a response to this project to glorify the intellectuals. He does
not, however, take the time to work out this useful insight.
Goodman (1994, 39) also notes that the Second Discourse was a
reply to d’Alembert, though she too confines her comments to a
few sentences and does not explore her claim.
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Des Grands,’’ d’Alembert argues that the men of
letters constitutes the true aristocracy and should
assume their rightful place at the top of the social and
cultural ladder (though he sternly advises them to avoid
politics).24 ‘‘The wise man,’’ he boldly proclaims,
‘‘does not forget that if there is an external respect
which talents owe to titles, there is another and more
real onewhich titles owe to talents’’ (d’Alembert 1967c,
357). Or more gently put, ‘‘a man of letters, full of
probity and talent, is without comparison more
worthy than an incapable minister or a dishonored
aristocrat’’ (d’Alembert 1967c, 354). Likewise, in the
preface to volume three of the Encyclope´die, d’Alembert
mockingly informs princes and nobles that they will
only find themselves included in the Encyclope´die if
they earn it ‘‘because the Encyclope´die owes every-
thing to talents, nothing to titles, and that is the
history of the human spirit and not the vanity of
men’’ (d’Alembert 1967b, 389).25 The other philoso-
phes were fully on board with this project. Diderot,
Rousseau’s best friend among them, similarly makes
repeated calls for the elevation of the intellectuals in
French society (Hulliung 1994, 133). Additionally, in
a famous passage of Le Fils Naturel, he links this
glorification of the talented with civic republicanism,
arguing that the talented have a unique obligation to
serve society.26 In the play, Constance tells Dorval:
‘‘you have received the rarest talents, and you must
render them to society. Let the useless move about
without object, embarrass society without serving it,
and distance themselves from it. They can. But you,
I dare say, cannot without it being a crime’’ (Diderot,
1772, 93).
This campaign to raise the social status of the
intellectuals, however, would eventually reveal a
different side to the philosophes—one not nearly as
congenial to the peasants and working classes as some
of the aforementioned attitudes evinced in Diderot’s
plays and d’Alembert’s Preliminary Discourse. The
belief that they were an elite class, both smarter and
more virtuous than the mass of ordinary citizens, was
accompanied by arrogance and contempt for provin-
cial life. Several followed Voltaire, who famously
supported monarchy, in his low assessment of the
demos and the belief that they were a threat to
intellectual life. For example, d’Alembert, in contrast
to his statements in the Preliminary Discourse, be-
lieves his battle was not only with the aristocrats, but
also ‘‘with the apathy and indifference of the masses
who are interested in neither toleration, freedom,
nor enlightenment’’ (Grimsley 1963, 118).27 Diderot
too revealed himself at times to be no friend of the
average person. ‘‘The sense of the inequality of
men . . . was deeply rooted in him’’ (Dieckmann
1941, 159), and he would occasionally disparage the
mediocrity of the peasant classes. In one of his more
caustic remarks, he wryly asserts that ‘‘mediocre men
live and die like brutes’’ (1966, 87, [Lettres A Mme
Volland]). Tellingly, some of Diderot’s sympathizers
concede that when he tries to be complimentary
towards the peasants in his plays, his portrayals are
less than compelling and betray ‘‘a wide gulf between
observer and observed’’ (France 1983, 85–85). Even if
the philosophes were of two minds about the peasants
and working classes, however, Rousseau had more
than enough evidence to be convinced that his
philosophe friends were disingenuous in their praises
of the peasants and working classes. Their supposed
ambivalence, he assumed, was yet another instance of
their hypocrisy, and, in any event, did nothing to
soften the implications of d’Alembert’s call to judge
people by their intellectual abilities.28 Rousseau’s
suspicions that the philosophes at heart were con-
temptuous of the masses must have been confirmed
on Shrove Tuesday in 1754, mere months before
he penned the Second Discourse. On that date in
d’Holbach’s salon, Rousseau attended a reading of a
tragedy by the Abbe´ Petit, a provincial from Normandy,
set up by Diderot. The reading was a disaster from
beginning to end, as the Abbe´ began spouting out
numerous absurdities on the nature of tragedy and
quickly revealed he had zero literary talents. Rather
than politely allowing the Abbe´ to finish and sending
24For a good discussion, see Grimsley (1963, 125–31). D’Alem-
bert actually was annoyed that Voltaire in his personal life was
too friendly with the aristocrats and clergy. Moreover, as Good-
man points out, d’Alembert’s essay is in the same spirit as
Voltaire’s chapter, ‘‘On the Regard that ought to be shown to
Men of Letters,’’ in Letters Concerning the English Nation (1994,
35–39).
25The last clause, about the vanity of men, appears to be directed
at Rousseau.
26Notably, he does not say government. The relevance of this
distinction will soon become apparent.
27In his reply to Rousseau’s letter on the theater, he further
demonstrates the low opinion he had of the lives of ordinary
people. In defending the theater, he asks ‘‘Why begrudge men,
destined by nature almost only to weep and die, some fleeting
diversions that help them bear the bitterness or the insipidity of
their existence’’ (Rousseau 2004, 354).
28Rousseau’s position seems to be that the philosophes could not
simultaneously celebrate talent as the true measure of human
worth and respect those without it, i.e., the working classes,
artisans, and peasants. Their confidence that they had unique
talents, Rousseau thinks, produced in them a subtle arrogance
and contempt. The discussion of amour propre in the Second
Discourse, as will be shown, provides solid evidence for this view.
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him on his way without any unnecessary encourage-
ment, the attending members of the d’Holbach
coterie were determined to humiliate him. They put
‘‘up a mock show of admiration for the wretched
author’s tragedy’’ (Cranston 1982, 313). Rousseau was
horrified by his friends’ puerile behavior and not so
gently informed the author of the humiliating truth
of the situation. Rather than thank Rousseau for his
candor, however, the clueless Abbe´ turned his anger
on Rousseau, and the two had to be separated before
things turned violent. Rousseau’s Anglo biographers,
while intrigued by the story, usually fail to appreciate
its true significance. Typically, it is read in light of
Rousseau’s fraying relationship with the philosophes.29
However, the actual content of the dispute is far more
revealing and ties in with Rousseau’s arguments at
the end of the First Discourse. The poor Abbe´ be-
comes the object of ridicule for the sole reason that
he lacks literary talent. The philosophes in the room
affirm themselves on the basis of their superior talent.
And, worst of all, the value of the Abbe´’s personality
would invariably decline in his own eyes if he
understood and accepted the truth of the situation.
If so, he would be led to erroneously conclude that
his contributions to the world as a religious leader
are meaningless and that his life only has value if he is
a writer. For Rousseau, this must have been a cruel
case in which life imitated art, and it probably
reminded him of his worry that in a culture enam-
ored of the arts and sciences, a great clothier would
be shamed into giving up his trade in order to
become ‘‘a bad versifier or an inferior Geometer’’
(Rousseau 1964, 29 [First Discourse])—or, in this
case, an awful playwright.
In the years right after the publication of the First
Discourse, therefore, Rousseau found himself in a
controversial debate regarding the value of arts and
sciences. The debate, however, quickly evolved into a
debate about the role and value of the artists and
scientists themselves rather than their activities. The
philosophes, Rousseau realized, were promoting them-
selves as a social class as much as the knowledge they
sought to create and catalogue. Paralleling this glori-
fication of the talented was a healthy, if not always
publicly expressed, contempt for average people, who
according to the new value system were encouraged to
view themselves through the eyes of those who looked
down upon them. The psychological and existential
consequences of this project, Rousseau well under-
stood, were devastating. In the Second Discourse, he
deftly and discreetly develops this original insight
with the help of a new concept, amour propre.
Amour Propre and Talent in the
Second Discourse
The connection between amour propre and talent in
the Second Discourse is extremely subtle and easy to
miss. In the beginning of the essay, in fact, Rousseau
appears to dismiss talent as unimportant for his
thesis. His first substantive distinction, one between
natural or physical inequality and moral or political
inequality, invites this conclusion. The former refers
to age, physical and mental talents, and health, while
the latter to inequalities based on convention estab-
lished by some sort of consent (Rousseau 1964, 131
[Second Discourse]). After making this distinction,
Rousseau asserts that inquiring into the origin of
natural inequality is pointless, as no one knows why
people are born with certain attributes and talents.
He also believes it is useless to debate whether or not
there is an ‘‘essential connection’’ between the two
inequalities. Thus, it is tempting to interpret Rousseau
here as trying to direct the reader’s attention away
from in-born talents and toward political and eco-
nomic inequality. Put another way, it might be argued
that Rousseau decouples physical from political in-
equality and is only concerned with the treatment of
the poor and the behavior of the political and eco-
nomic elite. This interpretation, however, becomes
less plausible the further one moves through the text.
Throughout the essay, the issue of ability and talent
arises repeatedly. Rousseau, in fact, ends the discourse
by making the very connection that in the beginning
he appears to regard as a waste of time: ‘‘Moral [poli-
tical] inequality, authorized only by positive right, is
contrary to Natural Right every time it is not of the
same proportion as Physical inequality’’ (Rousseau
1964, 193–94 [Second Discourse]).
The conclusion is instructive. Rousseau appa-
rently accepts political inequality as legitimate so long
as it corresponds to natural inequality. This is not the
first time he makes this claim. In the First Discourse,
he calls for the wise and the talented to counsel kings
29See Cranston (1982, 313) and Damrosch (2005, 251–52):
Damrosch adds slightly to Cranston’s analysis by speculating
that Rousseau was projecting his own insecurities on to the Abbe´.
Furbank, a Diderot biographer, also has little to say about the
event. His only concern is that it did not break up Diderot and
Rousseau’s friendship (Furbank 1992, 117–18). Wilson takes the
standard line that it is a sign of souring relationships between
Rousseau and the philosophes, although, nearer to my point, he
does suggest it has much to do with Rousseau’s belief that
philosophy diminishes civic friendship (Wilson 1972, 181–82).
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and charges them to ‘‘find honorable asylum in the
courts’’ (1964, 29–30). In later writings such as The
Social Contract (1964, 407) and the Constitutional
Project for Corsica (1964, 907), he continues this line
by advocating for administrative rule by an elected
aristocracy. It is thus clear that Rousseau thinks it is a
waste of time to debate whether or not natural in-
equality ought to correspond to political power. For
him, it is a truism that they should and there is no
profit to be had in debating something so self-
evident. Likewise, he claims it is pointless from a
philosophical standpoint to evaluate the current po-
litical leaders and determine whether or not they
merit their authority. One of the purposes of the
Second Discourse is to discover not if natural and
political inequality ought to be proportional but why
they often are not. The answer to this question, and
indeed the question itself, is directly linked to
Rousseau’s debate with d’Alembert and the philosophes’
claims that the men of letters should constitute a new
cultural aristocracy and avoid political life. Thus, in
concluding the Second Discourse in such a way,
Rousseau appears to echo one of lessons from the
First Discourse: that talent is socially harmful except
when expressed through administrative political power.
In between the introduction and the conclusion,
Rousseau seeks to demonstrate the catastrophic
effects that would occur if talent is not confined to
the state. His primary tactic is to create a genealogy of
natural inequality and then identify all the psycho-
logical, cultural, economic, and eventually political
damage that occurs when natural inequalities are
allowed to run wild. The first step in this genealogy
is his famous state of nature parable in which he
imagines what humans are like at the dawn of history.
The defining feature of the state of nature is that
talent and ability are almost entirely absent. Rousseau’s
original humans (l’homme sauvage) lack virtually
every quality and ability by which civil or contem-
porary humans compare themselves. From a cogni-
tive standpoint, they were probably no more
sophisticated than the average house pet. They had
no language, from which Rousseau deduces they were
incapable of reason. Lacking reason, they had no
imagination. And with no imagination, they had no
moral life; they were, so to speak, before good and
evil. L’homme sauvage was an entirely corporeal
being. To be sure, slight physical differences did exist
among these early humans. Some were stronger,
faster, or more attractive than others. These differ-
ences, however, had almost no significance because
original humans lived in solitude and survival was a
relatively easy affair. Thus, they did not have to
compete for self-preservation. The only thing that
might possibly foment conflict was sexual appetite.
Again, Rousseau demonstrates that a phenomenon
that causes infinite problems for modern, civilized
humans was innocuous for original humans. These
humans only knew lust and had no notion of the
moral side of love. Bereft of reason, they had no
standards of beauty and merit and as such did not
compare their sexual partners with those of their
counterparts (Rousseau 1964, 158 [Second Discourse]).
It never occurred to them that a more desirable
partner might be available. Savage love was a purely
physical affair.30 Moreover, he rejects attempts to
analogize the sexual behavior of ‘‘savage’’ humans
with other animals. He finds the comparison of
human sexual competition to cockfights as especially
inappropriate. Humans do not experience heat, and
there was little chance of rejection because, unlike
roosters and hens, there was in all probability an equal
proportion of men and women (Rousseau 1964, 159
[Second Discourse]). Therefore, any physical differences
between humans—the only ones that could exist—
were imperceptible and practically meaningless. For a
creature utterly lacking in self-consciousness with
easily satisfied needs, who rarely saw the same person
twice, inequality was utterly insignificant.
From this preliminary discussion, it is clear that
amour propre cannot exist when humans have devel-
oped few of their capacities and live nomadic life-
styles. This would imply that amour propre is a social
phenomenon that has lots to do with inequalities in
talent.31 And so it is:
It became customary to assemble in front of the Cabins
or around a large Tree: song and dance, true children of
leisure, became the amusement or rather the occupation
of idle men and women gathered in a crowd. Everyone
began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked
30Sexual appetite later plays a meaningful part in the drama of
amour propre. When humans develop to the point in which they
live in close proximity to one another, termed ‘‘savage nation’’ by
Rousseau, sexual appetite is identified as one cause that induces
individuals to be sociable (Rousseau 1964,169 [Second Dis-
course]). Sexuality, furthermore, is dramatically altered by amour
propre, i.e., it makes sexuality a social phenomenon. In this
modified form, it compels people and teaches them how to
compare and evaluate themselves against others. Thus, it serves as
a catalyst and precondition of amour propre. However, Rousseau’s
discussion is uneven at best, and sometimes he rejects the
connection between sexual rivalry and amour propre (O’Hagan
1999, 164–65). In Emile, Rousseau more tightly connects sex-
uality and amour propre (cf. Masters (1968, 40–44) for a useful
discussion on the matter.)
31He does, however, admit the first stirrings of human pride
come from reflecting upon superiority over animals (Rousseau
1964, 166 [Second Discourse]).
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at himself, and public esteem acquired a price. The one
who sang or danced best; the handsomest, the strongest,
the most skillful, or the most eloquent came to be the
most highly regarded, and this was the first step at once
toward inequality and vice: from these first preferences
on one side were born vanity and contempt, on the
other shame and envy; and the fermentation caused by
these new leavens at last produced compounds fatal to
happiness and innocence. (Rousseau 1964, 169–70
[Second Discourse])
In this passage, hereinafter referred to as the
‘‘competition for esteem,’’ Rousseau details the psycho-
logical transformation—the birth of amour propre—
that occurs with the advent of organized social living.
In constant contact and close proximity with one
another, these newly social humans get used to seeing
others and being seen by them. This increased
visibility leads humans to continually compare them-
selves to each other. These comparisons are partic-
ularly interesting because there is some permanence
to them. Whereas l’homme sauvage made few com-
parisons and probably forgot them immediately upon
making them, social humans remember their com-
parisons because frequent contact with the same
people forces them to make the same comparisons
over and over again. Through such repeated compar-
isons, individuals begin to develop an identity and
sense of individuality. They are no longer merely
bundles of appetites, but become self-aware sub-
jects.32 Secondly, in the competition-for-esteem pas-
sage Rousseau identifies the locus of a person’s
identity: abilities and qualities, e.g., the one who
sings the best or dances the best, the handsomest,
etc.33 The participants in the competition for esteem,
however, are not just singing and dancing. They are
becoming singers and dancers. Implied in this para-
ble, moreover, is that individuals can also develop an
identity based on their deficiencies. A person, for
example, can develop an identity of unusual clumsi-
ness. Others, furthermore, may fail to develop much
of an identity at all, if they have no distinguishing
traits. The psychological consequences of socializa-
tion are profound. Self-consciousness develops and
the emotional repertoire of humans expands beyond
the basic emotions to include vanity, contempt, envy,
shame, spite, etc.—a set of emotions all related to
amour propre.
The competition, moreover, is even worse than it
initially appears. First, it produces perverse inter-
personal dependencies. According to the logic of the
competition, people rely on each other for favorable
evaluations even though they have no incentive to
provide such praise (Rousseau 1969, 493 [Emile]).
For every time they laud one of their peers, they make
themselves more ordinary by comparison. Second,
most people are destined to a life of frustration
because competitions by definition create winners
and losers, and only a few people can gain distinction.
The competition for esteem is zero-sum. Thus, the
development of social life prompts a troubling
revolution in human nature. Once settled in villages,
humans become individuals with new existential
needs, i.e., the desire to know the meaning and value
of their lives, that compel them to compete with their
peers for recognition—a competition that will deter-
mine their earthly fate (Rousseau 1964, 174 [Second
Discourse]) and produce demoralizing hierarchies.34
L’homme sauvage, conversely, did not have these
problems. He or she lacked a sense of identity and
cared nothing for external affirmation. He or she was
‘‘the sole judge of his [or her] own merit’’ (Rousseau
1964, 219 [Second Discourse]).35
Hidden in the depths of this powerful social
ontology is a subtle and poignant attack on the
philosophes. Importantly, Rousseau thinks this first
meaningful inequality is social rather than economic
or political. The personalities of the rich and poor,
i.e., vanity and contempt for those judged favorably
by their peers and shame and envy for those judged
poorly or not at all, appear before there are actual
economic classes or government. They are based,
rather, on social status. Judging from the competition
for esteem parable, the basis of this social inequality
32The philosopher Daniel Dennett argues that ‘‘our kind of
reflective thinking is a very recent evolutionary innovation’’
(1996, 48) and distinguishes us from nonhuman animals.
33For a good discussion, see Charvet (1974, chap. 1).
34Dent and Grant are both critical of the ‘‘competition for
esteem’’ parable because they think Rousseau provides no reasons
why the ability to make comparisons results in vanity in a context
in which an organized economy has yet to emerge (Dent 1988,
81–82; Grant 1994, 156.) My narrative, however, answers this
question. People care about what others think of them because
such evaluations determine the quality of their public life.
35Interestingly, the emotions resulting from the failure to attain
external affirmation do not produce new actions or attitudes. In
similar parables and analyses, such as Nietzsche’s slave revolt or
Tocqueville’s portrait of democratic psychology in Democracy in
America, the family of existential emotions (resentment, spite,
envy, etc.) has great social and political impact. In Nietzsche’s
slave revolt, simmering resentment leads to a revolution in the
value structure. Similarly, in Tocqueville (1969, 198), democratic
envy induces Americans, among other things, to ignore talent
and vote for mediocre political leaders. By contrast, Rousseau’s
‘‘losers’’ in the competition for esteem seem to have no response
to their predicament and are easily fooled into accepting a social
contract that solidifies their lowly status. For a bold attempt to
provide a systematic phenomenological account of the emotional
processes described by Nietzsche, Tocqueville, etc. (see Sartre
1994).
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emerges from two criteria. The first is talent, which
is Rousseau’s primary interest. People want to be
known as the best singers and dancers, the strongest,
the most skillful, and the most eloquent; all of which
refers to innate physical or intellectual abilities. The
second is physical appearance. Participants in the
competition also strive to be the ‘‘handsomest.’’
These two criteria suggest that the amour propre is
in large part aimed at Parisian intellectual life and
d’Alembert et al.’’s call to elevate the social status of
the intellectuals. Before Rousseau sets foot in Paris,
he is well aware of how a young man from the
provinces might climb the social ladder. To recall an
earlier passage from The Confessions, Rousseau opines
‘‘a young man who arrives in Paris with a passable
appearance and who is heralded for his talents is
always sure of being welcomed’’ (Rousseau 1959, 283
[Confessions] italics mine). Not coincidentally, these
two traits—appearance and talent—are the standards
by which the participants in ‘‘the competition for
esteem’’ are evaluated by their peers. Of course, in
Rousseau’s Paris people are doing more than singing
and dancing. They are also writing, painting, com-
posing, arguing, etc. Still, the analogy is obvious
enough. People cultivate identities and earn social
respect based on the demonstration of their unique
abilities. Moreover, the psychological implications of
the competition also seem inspired by the philosophes.
The vanity and contempt that shows up in the winners
is reminiscent of the scorn Rousseau believed that
d’Alembert, Diderot, etc. felt towards the masses.
Having grown up and spent much time among the
peasants, Rousseau was certain they were being de-
meaned by the intellectuals. Finally, the idea that life
is a zero-sum competition in which only few people
can be special likewise is a consequence of the
philosophe worldview that celebrates the men of letters.
In any case, this metaphorical evidence from ‘‘the
competition for esteem’’ passage, i.e., individual
comparisons are primarily made on the basis of
talent, is buttressed by several key passages in the
Second Discourse in which Rousseau explicitly makes
the argument that the social valuation of talent
inflames amour propre. First, he suggests that equality
in civil society could continue only ‘‘if talents had
been equal’’ (Rousseau 1964, 174 [Second Discourse]).
Second, he asserts that ‘‘here are all natural qualities
put into action, every man’s rank and fate is
established, not only as to the amount of their goods
and the power to help or harm, but also as to mind,
beauty, strength or skill, as merit or talent’’ (Rousseau
1964, 174 [Second Discourse]). Finally, he bluntly
states, ‘‘I would show that of these four sorts of
inequality [wealth, nobility and rank are the oth-
ers] . . . personal qualities are the origin of all others’’
(Rousseau 1964, 189 [Second Discourse]). Looking
back on Rousseau’s state of nature, to reiterate, it is a
place of equality because there is only the slightest
difference in human abilities. Most human faculties
had yet to develop, and the ones that did exist had no
stage on which to exhibit themselves due to the
isolated lifestyle of savage men. For Rousseau, the
history of humanity is the slow development of talent
and eventually the creation of a social stage on which
inequalities in talent come to have the utmost sig-
nificance, at first existentially and later economically.
In one sense, it operates along the same lines as
wealth. When it becomes noticeable, it only serves to
remind most people that they do not have it and thus
makes them miserable (Rousseau 1969a, 1089 [Moral
Letters]).
None of this is meant to suggest that Rousseau is
unconcerned with class conflict and economics or
political oppression.36 On the contrary, Rousseau
spends a good deal of part two in the Second
Discourse exposing the devious ideological and polit-
ical machinations of the moneyed classes and arguing
that certain economic arrangements are necessary
conditions for the inflammation of amour propre.
Specifically, he believes amour propre only becomes
dangerous with the advent of the division of labor
after metallurgy and agriculture make their way on to
the historical scene. He in fact describes the nascent
villages in the ‘‘competition for esteem passage’’ in
which amour propre first emerges as the golden age
for humanity. The participants in the competition,
after all, are still singing and dancing, and the
impending class warfare Rousseau spends much of
part two of the essay describing had yet to emerge.
With the advent of division of labor, however, amour
propre begins to overwhelm the human personality.
Rousseau thinks this inflammation happens for two
reasons. The first is that division of labor promotes
social integration and visibility. That is, an economy
based on division of labor compels society-wide
cooperation in which there is no way to avoid seeing
and being seen. Individuals are forced to interact with
one another because they assume a specialized role in
the economy and rely on others to take care of a good
deal of their needs. As such, they cannot help but
come into contact with one another. Before the
division of labor, individuals were self-sufficient
36Starobinksi (1971b), Jack (1989, chap. 3), and Rosenblatt
(1997) are particularly helpful on the intersection between amour
propre and economics.
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and could labor mostly in solitude. Interpersonal
comparisons, therefore, were made sparingly and had
little connection to self-preservation. Second, divi-
sion of labor demands differentiation, which makes
social and economic equality impossible. In a diverse
economy that sustains numerous professions, it is
reasonable to conclude that the talented assume the
most demanding jobs and reap the lion’s share of the
economic rewards and social prestige. Natural qual-
ities and abilities, as a result, come to have significant
social meaning. So, thanks to economic develop-
ments, amour propre comes to be the dominant trait
in human nature, slowly supplanting natural com-
passion. In turn, moreover, it drives the economy a` la
Mandeville. Hungry for approval, people become
more and more productive so that they can stand
above their peers by being more ‘‘successful.’’ To
show off their success, they increase their consump-
tion habits, i.e., conspicuous consumption, which
leads to more and more production (Rousseau 1964,
937 [Constitutional Project for Corsica]).37
Nevertheless, despite the crucial role economic
forces such as division of labor play in this drama, it
would be a mistake to interpret amour propre pri-
marily as a device to discredit capitalism or highlight
economic exploitation and excessive consumption.
The problem of division of labor is not that it creates
amour propre but that it intensifies it. As Rousseau
puts it, division of labor is a ‘‘leaven,’’ not a cause. In
terms of amour propre, division of labor is a problem
because it highlights natural inequalities and not
simply because it produces excess wealth (which also
bothered Rousseau). Excessive consumption likewise
is only a consequence of amour propre, not its es-
sence. At its foundation, amour propre is about
natural inequalities in talents and the ranking of
people by those talents. While there may be consid-
erable overlap between social and economic inequal-
ity, it would be a mistake to confuse the two. There
are social inequalities that have little or no connec-
tion to wealth. Voltaire was offensive to Rousseau
because he demanded social prestige for his literary
talents and not simply because he was wealthy.
Likewise, many of the first inequalities described in
the ‘‘competition for esteem’’ passage—the ones
revealed in ‘‘leisurely’’ activities such as singing and
dancing—cannot meaningfully be connected to eco-
nomic productivity. People did not become wealthy
in Paris, or for that matter Geneva, by being the best
singer or dancer.38 So, as with the First Discourse,
economic inequality is a consequence of the arts and
sciences and worsens an already dangerous situation.
Well-Used Talent
In addition to identifying when talent is corrosive,
Rousseau is sure to provide in his oeuvres a few
instances of what might be termed, to twist Machia-
velli’s famous epigram of ‘‘well-used cruelty,’’ well-
used talent. First, as previously argued, talent is well
used when it expresses itself in government admin-
istration. There, it is safely hidden in the bowels of
government away from public view. As such, it can
help the polity prosper without drawing undue
attention to itself and reminding the masses of their
ordinariness. In the Social Contract and other later
writings, Rousseau makes a distinction between
sovereignty and administration. Everyone is to be
sovereign and equally govern society, which provides
a healthy measure of dignity. In this arrangement,
public identities are equal, for everyone is a citizen.
However, administration, the actual business of poli-
tics, is to be performed by a few excellent men. In
Letters from a Mountain, reiterating his thesis, Rous-
seau claims that ‘‘the best government is aristocratic,
the worst sovereign is aristocratic’’ (Rousseau 1964,
809 [Letters Written from the Mountain]). The prob-
lem with d’Alembert and the philosophes, Rousseau
contends, is that they argue the opposite. According
to d’Alembert, the intellectually talented should be
sovereign and should guide society’s values, but
should avoid administration and political power
whenever possible (d’Alembert 1967c, 356 [‘‘Essai
sur la Socie´te´ des Gens de Lettres et des Grands’’];
Hulliung 1994, 91–92).39 He wants the gifted not
37It is worth noting that in a footnote in ‘‘Preface to Narcisse’’
(1961, 969–70), Rousseau argues that not all societies suffer from
amour propre to the same degree. Anticipating the argument
from the Second Discourse, he claims savage societies do not
suffer from amour propre and European ones do. If his insight is
pushed a little further, the case can be made that not all European
societies and cities contain equal amounts of amour propre.
Citizens living in cities and nations with thriving economies
and intellectual cultures in which certain talents are regularly
rewarded will be more prone to amour propre.
38This is especially true of Geneva. Since the days of Calvin,
Geneva had banned the theatre. It bothered Rousseau to no end
that Voltaire, d’Alembert, etc., were trying to reintroduce theatre
to his birthplace. Even in Paris, however, intellectuals were in a
position of financial dependence. Voltaire (1994, 112) loudly
complains, though wealthy himself, that the men of letters had to
rely on wealthy women for monetary support.
39Moreover, to recall an earlier cited passage from Diderot’s Le
Fils Naturel, Constance tells Dorvel he must use his talents to
serve society in general, not the government.
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only in plain view of the masses, but celebrated as the
finest the species has to offer.
Moreover, the political ramifications of elevating
the talented, above and beyond the bogus social con-
tract the rich trick the poor into joining, are signi-
ficant. For a couple of reasons, Rousseau’s insistence
that government be administered by the wise will be
jeopardized. First, as just argued with the philosophes,
the talented will be unsatisfied with the mundane life
of an administrator and will seek fame and fortune
rather than do their civic duties. They will convince
themselves they are too important for political life
and leave it to lesser men. Second, when talent is the
means by which someone climbs the social ladder,
individuals will realize dissimulation is the ticket to a
better life, i.e., they can gain from pretending to be
something they are not (Rousseau 1964, 174 [Second
Discourse]).40 This hypocrisy will eventually work its
way into the political sphere. Even if the talented
wanted to rule, political power invariably will be
hijacked by clever charlatans utterly lacking in virtue
and true merit who wish to improve upon their
mediocre lot in life by pretending they have great
minds. In either case, natural and moral inequality
will become disproportionate and political corrup-
tion inevitable. Despite Rousseau’s profound com-
mitment to equality, he plainly understands that for
certain institutions and practices merit is the only
standard of justice that does not result in utter
absurdity. Otherwise, children might rule over adults
and imbeciles over wise men (Rousseau 1964, 194
[Second Discourse]). By celebrating talent, however,
excellent men are discouraged from entering govern-
ment, mediocre men are enticed, and the natural
order of things is thrown into disarray.
Second, in Emile and the Government of Poland,
Rousseau encourages competitions based on physical
talent. In Emile (1969a, 393–96), he holds running
races for young boys in which the winner is to receive
cake and be lavished with praise. The point, however,
is to teach Emile the value of running well and not to
feed his amour propre. Since the great vice of children
is gluttony and not vanity, Rousseau sees no harm in
such races (Rousseau 1969a, 409–10 [Emile]). Once
the age of reason begins, however, such contests end:
‘‘Let there never be any comparisons with other
children, no rivals, no competitors, not even in runn-
ing, once he [Emile] has begun to be able to reason’’
(Rousseau 1969a, 453–54 [Emile]). In Considerations
on the Government of Poland, moreover, he argues in
favor of festive public competitions in which the
participants are motivated by the desire to increase
‘‘their pride and self esteem’’ (1964, 958–59). How-
ever, the goal of these contests is not individual glory
but to make the participants more patriotic and
physically vigorous. Rather than encourage people
to think of themselves as talented, they were sup-
posed to promote the identity of citizen. So, as with
young Emile’s running races, the competitions advo-
cated for in Poland are meant to serve some higher
value and are not designed to create some sort of
hero worship for the most capable. Rousseau, there-
fore, does not want to deny completely the social
value of talent. He merely wants to prevent it from
becoming the source of a person’s identity and the
standard by which individual worth is measured.41
Used in such a manner, it is dangerous and creates far
more harm than good.
Conclusion
Hulliung, one of the few Rousseau scholars who
appreciates the depth of Rousseau’s concerns about
the Enlightenment glorification of talent, remarks in
passing that ‘‘Rousseau rejected their [the philosophes]
yearnings for a social order dedicated to fostering the
development of individual talent, which to him
would be nothing better than the triumph of amour
propre in its most virulent form’’ (1994, 133). While
Hulliung’s statement is technically true, it is too
general to capture the precise nature of Rousseau’s
critique. Rousseau is deeply ambivalent about talent.
While he worries about it, he also believes it has its
uses. In the First Discourse, he is content to let genius
develop, though he thinks the intellectually gifted
need no societal encouragement and can do so on
their own, and even provides a place for them, i.e.,
government, to thrive and benefit society at the same
time. What Rousseau ultimately objects to is the
attempt by the philosophes to make intellectual talent
the measure of a human. They are interested in social
and cultural power and have little desire to perform
40The Confessions is replete with examples of dissimulation and
play-acting in Parisian life, including offenses committed by
Rousseau himself. He even admits his misanthropy was an act
to hide his ignorance of Parisian mannerisms (Rousseau 1959,
368–69 [The Confessions]).
41Rousseau’s ambivalence shows up most prominently in his
Letter to d’Alembert on the Theatre. In that essay, he admits to
being an avid fan of Moliere’s plays (Rousseau 1969b, 131fn.)
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the political role of administrator that Rousseau sets
out for them. They want something much more: to
determine social value and reinvent the basis on
which a person’s public identity is determined. For
Rousseau, this amounts to little more than an
ideological glorification of the philosophes themselves,
the self-proclaimed geniuses of Paris. Their endorse-
ment of political equality is premised on a dangerous
new social inequality. Rousseau uses amour propre to
deconstruct the claims of people who seek to define
themselves as society’s most valuable members.
Unfortunately for Rousseau, he lost the debate
with the philosophes, and they succeeded in revolu-
tionizing modern consciousness. By the end of the
eighteenth century, their claims were quite common.
The champions of the emerging bourgeois society
argued talent is a far more suitable standard for
distributive justice than blood lineage. For example,
Thomas Paine, an unabashed partisan of Enlighten-
ment ideals, sarcastically ‘‘equates ‘nobility’ with ‘no
ability’’’ (Kramnick 1977, 7). In the culture at large,
moreover, the elevation of talent as a standard for
merit became the order of the day. Among the French
revolutionaries, it became an article of faith that
careers ought to be open to the talented. Today, one
would be hard-pressed to find someone willing to
endorse Rousseau’s argument in a public forum.
To be sure, Rousseau was not alone in decrying
the new social inequality. His argument gets picked
up by at least two eighteenth-century thinkers. Adam
Ferguson and John Adams, both of whom read
Rousseau, echo his concerns about the elevation of
a talented few. Ferguson straightforwardly applies
Rousseau’s theory to the emerging capitalism. In his
Essay on the History of Civil Society, Ferguson con-
tends that capitalism and its attendant division of
labor inspires the creation of all sorts of diverse and
interesting occupations. An individual can become a
banker, lawyer, etc. in addition to the older profes-
sions of farmer, baker, fisherman, smith, artisan, etc.
While he believes this development is appropriately
recognized as progress, he does concede the division
of labor has some negative existential implications. In
the new economy, he contends, profession becomes
the most important source of individual identity as
‘‘each individual is defined by his calling’’ (Ferguson
1995, 173). However, given that different employments
require different talents, Ferguson thinks those in the
simpler mechanical arts will be demeaned by such
evaluations and come to loathe their identities. Fur-
thermore, individuals in more elevated professions—
ones that require study and skill—will look down on
them and view them as men did slaves and women in
the ‘‘Rude Ages,’’ just as the winners in Rousseau’s
competition for esteem become contemptuous of the
losers (Ferguson 1995, 176). Ferguson ends his dis-
cussionwith amost Rousseauean conclusion: ‘‘Notwith-
standing any pretension to equal rights, the exaltation
of the few must depress the many’’ (1995, 177). John
Adams departs slightly from Rousseau in his ‘‘Dis-
courses on Davila,’’ but nevertheless offers an argu-
ment easily traceable to the citizen ofGeneva.He agrees
that the new bourgeois social distinctions degrade
those at the bottom of the social ladder. Unlike
Rousseau, he identifies a novel way in which the upper
classes express their contempt toward the lower classes:
by ignoring them. Using the metaphor of ‘‘invisibil-
ity,’’ later made famous by Ralph Ellison as applied to
American racism, Adams claims members of the lower
classes are ‘‘not disapproved, censured, or reproached;
. . . only not seen’’ (1954, 183).
Rousseau, however, was far more impressed by
the dangers of the elevation of the talented than
either Ferguson or Adams, both of whom were good,
if somewhat cautious, Enlightenment liberals favor-
able to talent based meritocracy and similar notions
such as natural aristocracies. Unlike them, he wants
to stop this tenet of the Enlightenment dead in its
tracks and stood almost alone in his defiance. He also
knew that his was a tall order, and he had no illusions
about the nature of his enemy. While the Enlighten-
ment preaches truth and openness, the reality was
that it establishes itself through all sorts of hypocrisies
and self-deceptions that blinds the populace towards
society’s new pathologies. Rousseau was intent on
puncturing these hypocrisies and forcing us to see the
ugly side of bourgeois life. If nothing else, he wants
his contemporaries to know that the Enlightenment
promise to promote the dignity of the common man
is a lie. When talent is the measure of a man, the mass
of humanity will invariably be demeaned. Rousseau’s
lesson, if anything, is even more relevant today. At
the very least, he has taught us that social inequalities
are every bit as powerful as political and economic
ones.
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